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course for anyone wishing to do business online is to be
honest.

Abstract

The question is, will people use the services of trusted
third parties? How does the electronic market evolve?
Will individuals continue their electronic transactions
without the extra protection of TTPs, as most of the
transactions are done today, or will the transaction going
through a TTP become the dominant strategy in the
electronic market? This paper attempts to study the
dynamics of the electronic market by identifying the
different equilibria of the market and the characteristics of
different strategies using an evolutionary game theory
approach.

Using an evolutionary game approach, this paper
studies different equilibria in the electronic marketplace,
and demonstrates that electronic transaction through a
TTP is an evolutionarily stable strategy. According to the
evolutionary game analysis, people will gradually adopt
this strategy in the electronic marketplace.

Introduction
Electronic commerce arguably provides better
efficiency for many types of business. However, the lack
of trust and familiarity with the new digital economy
makes many people apprehensive about moving to the
electronic world. Fear of security breaches, mistrust in
the products and services offered online, and the lack of
legal structures are major obstacles to the growth of
electronic commerce. Ba et al. (1998) argue that
information asymmetry poses serious challenges to the
growth and wide adoption of electronic commerce. One
aspect of information asymmetry is security, and the other
one, perhaps more significant, is the product quality
uncertainty problem (Akerlof 1970). Certification
authorities (CA) such as Verisign have emerged in recent
years attempting to mitigate the security problem by
helping authenticate online traders (Froomkin 1997).
However, the current structure of CAs does not address
the product quality problem. An authenticated online
vendor (i.e., he holds a valid digital certificate) can still
cheat consumers by selling counterfeit products or
products that do not match up the promised quality. One
consequence could be that in the electronic marketplace
people only do business with well-established companies.
Small or new online business entities consequently may
be forced out of the market, which obviously impedes the
adequate growth of electronic commerce. Using a game
theoretic approach, Ba et al. propose a new design of
trusted third parties (TTP) that not only issue digital
certificate, but also protect the interest of online players
by disseminating trading partner reputation. They have
demonstrated that with the help of TTP - an extralegal
economic incentive mechanism - the most profitable

Research Model: Electronic Transactions
with and without TTPs
In the global electronic market, vendors and buyers
randomly match with each other and play a two-person
game. Since a player can sometimes be a buyer and other
times a seller, we model the game as a symmetric game.
Building on the TTP model proposed by Ba et al (1998),
we assume that each player has two strategies available
for each business transaction in the electronic
marketplace: electronic transaction without going through
a TTP, and electronic transaction through a TTP.
In the electronic market, many products offered online
are digital products, which, incorporating the unique
advantages of the electronic media, are mostly experience
goods. Their quality becomes known only after
consumption (many information goods are purchased only
once). Therefore quality uncertainty is a critical issue
with respect to digital products. Conventional goods are
also an important component in the electronic market.
For example, it’s more convenient to order books, CDs, or
airplane tickets online than go to the physical stores or
agencies. However, all transactions in the electronic
market, regardless of conventional goods or digital goods,
have security and quality uncertainty problems. The
TTPs help mitigate the problems by tying a player’s
reputation to each transaction that he engages in.
Business agents need to maintain and protect their
reputation if they want to continue their business in the
global electronic market. By obtaining a digital
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certificate from a TTP, buyers and sellers get a guarantee
about the quality of their transactions. But buyers and
sellers that do not use the services of TTPs may be
cheated. For example, they may end up with counterfeit
products or products that do not match up the announced
quality. Therefore, in our model, the payoff a for
electronic transactions through a TTP is higher than the
payoff a ′ for electronic transactions without a TTP:
a > a′ .

also that the mutants all are programmed to play some
other (pure or mixed) mutant strategy y ∈ ∆ . The
payoff to strategy x ∈ ∆ is

u ( x, y ) when played
against y ∈ ∆ . A strategy x ∈ ∆ is evolutionarily
stable if and only if it meets the following two conditions
(Maynard Smith 1982, Weibull 1995):

u ( y, x ) ≤ u ( x, x )

∀y ,

u ( y, x) = u ( x, x) ⇒ u ( y, y ) < u ( x, y ) ∀y ≠ x .

Let ETTP denote electronic transactions through a
TTP, E electronic transactions without using the services
of a TTP, then we have the following table with the
respective payoff for each strategy.1

The first condition is a Nash equilibrium requirement
and the second one is a stability requirement which
ensures that the ESS x can repel mutants such as y . If

! 
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a′  a′
a′  a′

a′  a′
a a

  #$ Payoff to a player following the row strategy against a player
following the column strategy$ a > a′ > 0
the conditions fail, then the strategy
to invade x .

Obviously, there are two Nash equilibria in this game:
(E, E) and (ETTP, ETTP). Which equilibrium will the
trading partners play? We will use an evolutionary game
theory approach to analyze the situation.

y is said to be able

Theorem: In the electronic marketplace, ETTP is an
evolutionarily stable strategy.

A fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory is
that of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). An ESS is
a Nash equilibrium satisfying an additional stability
property. That is, an ESS should be able to withstand the
pressures of mutation and selection once it becomes
established in a population. (Maynard Smith and Price
1973, Maynard Smith 1982).

Proof.
i) Is

x = (1,0) an ESS?
x = (1,0) , this means consumer and
vendor all will play E, then u (x, x ) = a ′ . No
matter what y is, u ( y , x ) ≤ u ( x, x ) because
a ′ ≥ Co(a ′, a ′) (Convex hull of a ′, a ′ ).
If

Mathematically, the set of pure strategies is denoted

K = {1,2,..., k} and the associated mixed-strategy set,
∆ = {x ∈ R+k : ∑i∈K xi = 1} . Suppose that a small

Therefore, Condition 1 is satisfied,
and x = (1,0 ) is a Nash equilibrium strategy.

group of mutants appears in a large population of
individuals, all of whom are programmed to play the same
(mixed or pure) incumbent strategy x ∈ ∆ . Suppose

y = (0,1) , then
u ( y, x ) = u (x, x ) = a ′ . However,
u ( y, y ) = a , and u (x, y ) = a ′ , but a  a ′ ,
so u ( y , y ) > u ( x, y ) , then Condition 2 is not
satisfied. Therefore, x = (1,0 ) is a Nash
Suppose

              
              
           
         

1

equilibrium strategy but not an ESS.
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ii)

Is

x = (0,1) an ESS?

opportunistic behaviors. Currently there are several
intermediaries that disseminate online product or service
quality information. For example, Bizrate
(www.bizrate.com) – a site that rates online merchants in
different categories – uses information from consumers to
keep track of merchants’ reputations; Carfax
(www.carfax.com) provides vehicle history information
to people shopping for a used vehicle. eBay
(www.ebay.com) – an online auction site – provides a
Feedback Forum that allows customers to leave
comments about their experiences with their eBay trading
partners. Even though these intermediaries deal with a
specific type of quality uncertainty problems, they could
be treated as the operational business model related to Ba
et al (1998) and this research paper.

x = (0,1) , this means consumer and
vendor all will play ETTP, then u ( x, x ) = a .
No matter what y is, u ( y , x ) ≤ u ( x, x )
because a ≥ Co(a ′, a ) . Therefore, Condition 1
If

is satisfied. Obviously, Condition 2 is also
satisfied, because we cannot find a y ∈ ∆ so
that u ( y , x )
is an ESS.

= u ( x, x) . Therefore x = (0,1)

Our proof shows that with the payoff structure

a > a ′ > 0 , ETTP is an ESS. In other words,

individuals who try to use ETTP do better than those
individuals who stick to the E strategy. Currently, many
individuals adopt the E strategy. They may enjoy all the
advantages associated with electronic transactions,
however, they may also experience problems arising from
the security and/or product quality uncertainty issues.
Therefore, trusted third parties come into the picture. The
conversion from E to ETTP basically is a learning
process. At the beginning, only a small group of
population may try to use ETTP. They provide a new
channel to conduct electronic transactions, which can be
considered a mutant strategy (ETTP). The information
about the experience may be reported in the media, may
be discussed in the news group, or spread through word of
mouth. If those individuals who try ETTP do less well
than those individuals who stick to the E strategy, then the
individuals who use E have no incentive to modify their
strategy and those who try ETTP will return to the
incumbent strategy. However, with the services of TTP,
ETTP is a better strategy that leads to a higher payoff. So
sooner or later, the mutant strategy, ETTP, will
successfully invade the electronic market. The
individuals who currently use E will eventually change
their strategy to ETTP.
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Conclusion
Using an evolutionary game theory approach, we
analyze the electronic marketplace, and demonstrate that
electronic transaction through a TTP (ETTP) is an
evolutionarily stable strategy. With the services of TTP,
people can learn about their trading partners’ reputation
before they conduct transactions. Therefore, they do not
have to be restricted to businesses with a household name.
They can go for small companies in the market as long as
these small companies have a good reputation. In a sense,
thus, TTPs help small or new companies to compete in
the electronic marketplace. This research has strong,
practical implications for intermediaries in the cyberspace
which offer services to protect market participants from
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